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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT FUMBLES THE SUPREME
COURT'S RECOGNITION OF A DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO SEXUAL INTIMACY
Paul F. Theiss*
N Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause protects a substantive right to sexual intimacy.'
But the Court articulated this right poorly, making Lawrence ambigu-
ous. Confused by this ambiguity, the Eleventh Circuit held in Williams v.
Attorney General of Alabama that the Due Process Clause does not guard
a right to use sexual devices. 2 Williams rightly held that Lawrence did not
recognize a fundamental right to sexual intimacy because the Supreme
Court did not apply a strict-scrutiny standard. 3 But Williams misjudged
the extent of the right that Lawrence announced, wrongly ignoring three
of Lawrence's propositions: (1) sexual intimacy is a form of due process
liberty; (2) a state's interest in preserving public morality is not a legiti-
mate interest that justifies criminalizing private conduct; and (3) courts
ought not to subject asserted sexual-intimacy rights to a Glucksberg
analysis.4
Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act prohibits the sale of any-
thing designed or marketed as a sexual device.5 The Act does not apply
to a sexual device that one acquires as a gift or purchases out-of-state, nor
does it prevent one from using or owning sexual devices. 6 The ACLU
sued to enjoin the Act for some sexual device users and vendors, arguing
that the Act violated a fundamental right to sexual intimacy because it
* This author thanks Dedman School of Law Professor Linda Eads for her invalua-
ble help in preparing this article.
1. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
2. 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
3. Id. at 1238.
4. Used to evaluate new fundamental-rights claims, a Glucksberg analysis (1) care-
fully describes the asserted fundamental right and then (2) determines whether that right is
deeply rooted "'such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right was] sacri-
ficed."' Id. at 1239 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
5. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (2004) (prohibiting the distribution of "any de-
vice designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs
for any thing of pecuniary value"). The specific devices mentioned in Williams were
vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial vaginas. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250.
6. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233.
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burdened the ability to use sexual devices.7 The user plaintiffs included
women who used sexual devices therapeutically. 8 The vendor plaintiffs-
who asserted their own rights and the rights of their customers who were
too embarrassed to sue9-sold sexual devices and paraphernalia. 10 One
of the vendors did so in a store near a Wal-Mart." That store had a
window that displayed the paraphernalia.' 2 The other vendor sold the
devices and paraphernalia at Tupperware-style parties.
The district court enjoined the Act on the grounds that it lacked a ra-
tional basis and thus was an unjustified state restriction.' 3 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that Alabama's interest in preserving public mo-
rality provided a rational basis.14 But it remanded because the district
court had failed to conduct a Glucksberg analysis to determine whether
the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to sexual intimacy.' 5 On remand,
the district court conducted this analysis and held that the plaintiffs had
such a right.16 Since the Act burdened this right, the district court en-joined the Act again.' 7 The State of Alabama appealed this decision.1 8
Before Williams returned to the Eleventh Circuit, two cases were de-
cided that affected the status of sexual intimacy as a due process right:
Lawrence v. Texas' 9 and Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Chil-
dren & Family Services.20 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Texas statute that criminalized gay sodomy. 2' Texas argued that its inter-
est in preserving public morality provided a legitimate interest that justi-
fied its statute.2 2 But the Court rejected this argument,23 adopting Justice
Stevens's dissenting view in Bowers v. Hardwick: "the fact that the gov-
erning majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice."' 24 The Court held that the Texas statute violated the most pri-
vate human conduct in the most private place-sexual intimacy in the
home.2 5 Although the statute proscribed a specific sexual act, the Court
held that framing the issue as whether the Due Process Clause protected
7. See id.
8. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265-67 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
9. Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
10. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-65.
11. Id. at 1265-66.
12. Id. at 1263-64.
13. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234.
14. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001).
15. Id. at 955-56.
16. Id.
17. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1234.
18. Id.
19. 539 U.S. 558.
20. 368 F.3d 804.
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
22. Respondent's Brief at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
23. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intru-
sion into the personal and private life of the individual." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
24. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted).
25. Id. at 567.
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a specific act would misjudge the "extent of the liberty at stake. '26 Law-
rence therefore framed its inquiry as whether the Due Process Clause
protected sexual intimacy.27 The Court classified sexual intimacy as a
form of due process liberty28 because it was a way that the plaintiffs
achieved personal autonomy.29 And states may not deprive their citizens
of this intimacy unless the deprivation furthers a legitimate state
interest. 30
In Lofton, gay plaintiffs cited Lawrence to argue that a Florida statute
prohibiting gays from adopting children violated their fundamental right
to sexual intimacy.31 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, hold-
ing that Lawrence was distinguishable. 32 The court also said in dictum
that Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right to sexual intimacy
because it neither conducted a Glucksberg analysis nor applied strict scru-
tiny.33 According to the court, Lawrence held only that states may not
criminalize private gay conduct. 34
With Lawrence and Lofton as fresh precedent when Williams re-
reached the Eleventh Circuit, the court had to look through a new lens to
determine whether the Due Process Clause protected a right to use sex-
ual devices. Judge Birch delivered the Williams opinion that resolved this
inquiry in the negative. 35 Adopting Lofton's dictum, Judge Birch held
that Lawrence did not announce a fundamental right to sexual privacy. 36
He reasoned that any other holding would "impose a fundamental-rights
interpretation on a decision that rested on rational-basis grounds, that
never engaged in Glucksberg analysis, and that never invoked strict scru-
tiny."' 37 He stressed that the Supreme Court consistently declined to rec-
ognize a fundamental right to sexual intimacy, despite having many
chances to do so. 38 Although he acknowledged that Lawrence was the
most recent of these chances,39 he said that Lawrence established only
that criminalizing consensual-adult sodomy was unconstitutional. 40 So he
labeled Lawrence's sexual-intimacy discussion "scattered dicta" 41 and
26. Id.
27. Id. at 564.
28. See id. at 578.
29. See id. at 574.
30. Id. at 578.
31. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815 (11th
Cir. 2004).
32. "[Florida's] action is not criminal prohibition, but grant of a statutory privilege.
And the asserted liberty interest is not the negative right to engage in private conduct
without facing criminal sanctions, but the affirmative right to receive official and public
recognition." Id. at 817.
33. Id. at 816-17.
34. Id. at 815.
35. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250.
36. See id. at 1238.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1235.
39. Id. at 1236.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1236.
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viewed the ACLU's claim as an attempt to recognize a fundamental right
that no Supreme Court precedent had ever mentioned.42 This necessi-
tated a Glucksberg analysis to evaluate whether the Eleventh Circuit
ought to recognize a novel fundamental right.43 Thus, he narrowly
framed the alleged right as the right to use sexual devices." Declining to
announce this right, he reversed the district court's decision.45
Judge Barkett delivered Williams's dissent, arguing that the majority's
opinion conflicted with Lawrence's recognition of a fundamental right to
sexual intimacy.a6 She emphasized that Lawrence had granted certiorari
specifically to consider whether the petitioners, in exercising their due
process liberty, were free as adults to engage in private sexual conduct.47
Since the Supreme Court expressly resolved Lawrence under this issue,
she said that Lawrence's sexual-intimacy discussion was not "scattered
dicta.48
Judge Barkett also attacked the majority's failure to question why
Lawrence held criminal prohibitions against sodomy to be unconstitu-
tional. Lawrence, she said, held that a state may not criminalize sodomy
because adults have a right to sexual intimacy."9 Also, she questioned the
majority's inability to explain why public morality was a rational basis for
criminalizing sexual intimacy when the Supreme Court did not consider
public morality to be a legitimate state interest in Lawrence.50 Further,
she criticized how narrowly the majority framed the plaintiffs' asserted
right. To her, Lawrence demonstrated that reducing sexual intimacy to a
particular act demeans and trivializes sexual intimacy's importance to an
adult's private life.51
Despite Judge Barkett and Birch's arguments, neither judge grasped
the sexual-intimacy right that Lawrence declared. Judge Barkett's dissent
was wrong because-as Judge Birch correctly recognized in holding that
Lawrence did not consider sexual intimacy to be a fundamental right-
announcing a fundamental right without applying strict scrutiny would
have been illogical. On the other hand, Judge Birch's majority opinion
was wrong because it ignored Lawrence's holding that sexual intimacy is a
form of due process liberty. Lawrence considered sexual intimacy to be
an entirely private activity that is "but one element" in an enduring per-
sonal bond.52 Preserving public morality is not a legitimate state interest
that justifies criminalizing those bonds. So Judge Birch's holding mistak-
enly ignored Lawrence's recognition that "[o]ur obligation is to define the
42. Id. at 1239.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1242.
45. Id. at 1250.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1253 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence 539 U.S. at 564).
48. Id. at 1256.
49. Id. at 1251.
50. Id. at 1252.
51. Id. at 1255.
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." 53 Yet, a due process
right to sexual intimacy does not always trump a state's interests. 54 Ala-
bama might have justified the Act on a grounds other than public moral-
ity because it had a legitimate-state interest in regulating sexual-device
promotions that children could see. Considering the one vendor plain-
tiff's storefront display and proximity to Wal-Mart, this interest was cog-
nizable in Williams. And this was cause for distinguishing Williams from
Lawrence because the Texas statute lacked any rational basis.
Williams and Lawrence were further distinguishable because selling
sexual devices was neither private conduct nor a way that the vendor-
plaintiffs attained personal autonomy. Even assuming that the user-
plaintiffs' sexual device use established autonomy and personal bonds,
the Act only burdened sexual device use-the Act did not criminalize it.
A critical factor in Lawrence was that the Texas statute's criminal sanc-
tions stigmatized homosexual sodomy.55 Such vilification was absent
from Williams. So Judge Birch ought to have distinguished Lawrence, as
he did in Lofton, by basing Williams's holding on the factual differences.
Judge Birch's final mistake was subjecting the alleged sexual-intimacy
right to a Glucksberg analysis. He recognized that Lawrence was the lat-
est Supreme Court case on sexual intimacy as a due process right. But he
failed to question why Lawrence never employed Glucksberg. The Su-
preme Court had two reasons for deciding Lawrence without a Gluck-
sberg analysis. First, the asserted sexual-intimacy right in Lawrence was
different than the Glucksberg petitioners' asserted right to assisted sui-
cide. The Supreme Court declined to recognize a due process assisted-
suicide right in Glucksberg, arguably because "[t]he value to others of a
person's life is far too precious to allow the individual to claim a constitu-
tional entitlement to complete autonomy in making a decision to end that
life."' 56 A state's interest in preserving life exceeds its interest in criminal-
izing private sexual conduct. Such conduct reaches the core of personal
autonomy while compromising few essential state interests.
Second, Lawrence impliedly rejected the Glucksberg analysis's two
prongs. Lawrence held that modern traditions are most relevant when
analyzing sexual intimacy because they provide an emerging awareness
53. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)) (internal quotations omitted).
54. For example, the Due Process Clause would not protect an adult's sexual intimacy
with a minor because states have a legitimate interest in protecting those that cannot con-
sent. See id. at 578.
55. The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. The of-
fense, to be sure, is but.., a minor offense in the Texas legal system. Still, it
remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons
charged. The petitioners will bear on their record the history of their crimi-
nal convictions .... This underscores the consequential nature of the punish-
ment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the criminal
prohibition.
Id. at 575-76.
56. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 741 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that liberty protects how adults conduct their private sex lives.57 Law-
rence necessarily rejected the need for courts in sexual-intimacy cases to
apply Glucksberg's requirement that due process rights be deeply rooted
in our history. And Lawrence rejected Glucksberg's requirement that
courts describe asserted rights narrowly. Lawrence held that courts
misapprehend and thus demean sexual intimacy if they narrowly frame an
issue as whether the Due Process Clause protects a specific sexual act.
Indeed, Lawrence did not settle how far the Supreme Court will go to
protect sexual intimacy. But while the liberty that the Supreme Court
announced in Lawrence does not currently shield citizens from a statute
only burdening sexual intimacy, Williams is troubling for its failure to
properly delineate Lawrence for the Eleventh Circuit's lower courts. To
guard their sexual privacy from criminal sanctions aimed only at propa-
gating the governing majority's morality, citizens within the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's jurisdiction must now clear Glucksberg's high hurdles. This will
impede meaningful judicial discussions of sexual intimacy. Rather than
emphasize the enduring relationships of which sexual conduct is just one
element, courts under Williams will reduce personal bonds to particular
sexual acts. And that, as Lawrence instructs, demeans sexual intimacy.
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
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